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DETAIL OF THE REPLY
I. THE EVIDENCE CITED BY THE COMMISSION DOES NOT
SUBSTANTIALLY SUPPORT ITS DECISION.
The Commission supports its decision to allocate the value of the one acre
home site to the entire ten-acre building envelope in which it is found based on the
following facts: (I) "building rights" could be exercised throughout the 10-acre
building envelope and not just on the one-acre home site; (2) the County's
appraiser. Mr. Hales, allocated the value of the "building rights" to one acre only
because the County's policy establishes one acre as the standard size of a home
site in an otherwise agricultural property, and he would have been comfortable
allocating the "building rights" to the 10-acre building envelope if he'd been asked
to do so; (3) once the Commission allocated the value of the "building rights'* to
all ten acres in the building envelope, there was insufficient evidence to
differentiate the value between any of those ten acres: (4) the County did not
attempt to determine the value of a one-acre building lot through a direct sales
comparison approach; and (5) a one-acre home site could have been located
anywhere within the 10-acre building envelope. Brief of Commission dX 19-20.
A. Four of the Five Bases Cited to Support the Commission's Decision
Arise from the Commission's Misunderstanding of the Phrase "Rights
to Build."
The Commission's explanation, set forth above, confirms the County's
belief as expressed in its opening brief that the Commission misunderstood the

1

nature of the testimony relating to the "rights to build.'' Th^ evidence that was
intended to place a \alue on "the right to build a primary residence" was instead
interpreted as placing a value on "the right to build anything." This
misunderstanding, at least, explains the Commission's assertions numbered L 2. 3.
and 5, above. And it is this misunderstanding that led the Cibmmission to place as
much value in the right to build, sav. a corral as it did in the right to build a single
primary residence.
The Commission points to its examination of the County's expert. Blaine
Hales. The relevant lines are as follows:
MR. JOHNSON:

Okay great. Now did - as I listened to your testimony

and - um - perused your appraisal, you looked at one acre apd 159 acres. You
didn't look at all at the 10 acre envelope.
MR. HALES:

You know, if it would have beerl mv choice. I

probably would've gone with 10 acres and said one, but the (county told me that
their standard was one acre. And so MR. JOHNSON:
MR. HALES:

Okav.
I wanted to be consistent with Ivvhat the assessor had

been doing.
MR. JOHNSON:

So - so if I understand that correttly. then if you had

been asked - a change of an assignment - and I don't know how to find that, but
you would - in doing an allocation, you would have allocatep value to 10 acres?
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MR. HALES:

Well, I probably vvould\e chosen a little bit larger

parcel. But it's so difficult because with the assessment, you know, if they put a
barn on it - vou know - vou can't - thev only have a small envelope that they can
use and you have to assume that a lot of that will be used for- you know agricultural buildings. So - you know - the county's decision to go with one acre
was fine with me.
MR. JOHNSON:

So let me ask you, if this were just an appraisal

assignment and you were asked to value the various components - if there were
any MR. HALES:

Yes.

MR. JOHNSON:

Not even making that assumption, would - would you

have broken it down into one acre, 10 acre components or would you have valued
outside of the greenbelt statute just the entire 160 acres.
MR. HALES:

If somebody had asked me to just break out the

components, I probably would have just looked at it legally and not even worried
about the physical aspect of it. You know, I would*ve said this is what the
building right is worth MR. JOHNSON:

Oh.

MR. HALES:

This is what the land without it is worth. That is what

I would"\e done.
MR. JOHNSON:

And not associated with any specific acreage

MR. HALES:

Right. That's the simplest way to do it.

Record at 1446. starting line 7. to 1447, ending line 25.
MR. JOHNSON:

Oka}, thanks. Urn - if- again, don't let me force

words in your mouth, but it appears to me you may not hav^ "appraised*' a one
acre parcel of land, would that be correct?
MR. HALES:

I think that's correct. I think neither one of us

[referring also to the Petitioners* appraisal expert. Phil Cook] actually appraised a
one acre parcel. Both parties were trying to come to what hopefully what would
be a reasonable allocation for that component of the property.
MR. JOHNSON:

So you've allocated value to one acre of land?

MR. HALES:

With the building right included

MR. [JOHNSON]: So this—these are my words—are you essentially
allocating one of the sticks in the bundle of rights to an acre of land?
MR. HALES:

Those would be mv words too.

Record at 1448. starting line 25, to 1449, ending line 15.
In this interchange. Mr. Hales admits that he would h^ve preferred to
remove more than just one acre from the preferential treatment of the Farmland
Assessment Act ("FAA"): however, he used the one-acre size because that was the
standard adopted b> the Count} Assessor pursuant to the Commission's
instructions promulgated in its Standards of Practice. See Farmland Assessment
Act Standard of Practice 7.4.1 (attached as Exhibit 1). However, the interchange
also demonstrates that VIr. Hales was complete!} aware of w hat he actuallv did do:
namel}. value only one acre of land and also the right to bui d a home on that one
4

acre.1 In fact, he testified that the value of the right to build the home—that single
legal right among the figurative bundle of property rights—is the most important
part of the calculation; and the specific acre where that right is exercised is
relatively unimportant. Ho\ve\er. nowhere did Mr. Hales attempt to value the
right to build a caretaker's dwelling, a barn, or a corral. In fact, his con\ersation
with Commissioner Johnson contemplated that the right to build such buildings
was not included in the right to build a primary residence. Record at 1446.
starting line 23. to 1447, ending line 3 (Mr. Hales acknowledging that if the
Assessor removed too much land from the FAA for the residence, and if an
agricultural building were thereafter built on the land removed from the FAA, then
the Assessor would have violated the FAA*s tax break intended for land used for
agricultural buildings). As the value of the rights to build agricultural buildings
was not at issue before the Commission, the Commission should not have taken
the value that Mr. Hales had worked to establish for the right to build the primary
residence and diluted it to cover these other rights as well.
Had Mr. Hales been asked to do so, perhaps he could have calculated the
value of the rights to build a caretaker's dwelling, a barn, and a corral on the other
nine acres within the 10-acre building en\elopes. But nobody, including the
Commission, asked him to do so. Nevertheless, that does not mean that there is no
1

See also Record at 1420. lines 14-17 (valuing one acre of land "in terms of
space**); Record at 1413. line 20 (allocating value to the "home site"); Record at
1415. line 24. to 1416 line 2 (his assignment was to appraise the "one acre home
sites"); Record at 1434. lines 6-9 (Mr. Hales* methodology is "an allocation of
value to the one acre**).
5

difference in value between the one-acre home site and thejremaining nine acres in
the envelope. For example, for a $1.8 million parcel, Mr. Hales* allocations
assigned 65%—or $1.170.000—to the one-acre home site and $3,000 per acre—or
$450,000—to the conservation-easement burdened 150 acres. This left exactly
$180,000 to be allocated to the remaining nine acres of the tlen-acre building
envelope. If each of these nine acres were to be valued equally, then they would
be valued at $20,000 each. Notably, when the Commission took Mr. Hales*
allocation of value for the one acre home site and diluted it to cover these other
nine acres as well, it had to wipe out this $180,000 and leave it unaccounted for.
The foregoing explains how the Commission's justifications numbered 1, 2,
3, and 5, above are based on a misunderstanding of Mr. Hales" testimony.
Namely. (1) while the Commission is correct that generally termed "building
rights" are enjoyable throughout the 10-acre building envelope, the right to build a
primary residence—the only right evaluated at trial—is enjoyable only on one of
those acres; (2) had the County's standard adopted pursuant to Standard of
Practice 7.4.1 been to remove ten acres from greenbelt for a residential dwelling.
Mr. Hales would have been comfortable applying the right to build a primary
residence to those ten acres, but since the County's standard is more generous to
the landowner and only removes one acre from greenbelt for a dwelling. Mr Hales
conscientiously valued only that one acre: (3) contrary to the Commission's
conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to differentiate the \alue between
the one acre home site and the remaining nine acres in the buil|ding envelope, the
6

evidence established that the one-acre home site was worth, in a $1.8 million
parcel, more than $1 million while the remaining nine acres were worth no more
than 520,000 per acre; and (5) while it is true that the one-acre home site could
have been located an\ where within the ten-acre building envelope, it could never
be used on more than one acre, and in each of these cases the acre on which it was
used had been clearlv identified by the construction of the primary residence on
that acre.
B. While a Direct Sales Comparison Approach Mav Have Been Helpful
its Absence Does Not Support the Commission's Decision.
The County now turns to the Commission's fourth basis for its decision.
The Commission points out that the County did not undertake a direct sales
comparison to determine the value of the one-acre home site. This is true: the
Count} did not. Indeed, it is interesting that the Commission faults the County for
not employing this appraisal device while the Petitioners claim that the County
actually did emplo\ the device and shouldn V have. Reply Brief of Petitioners at
12.
Instead of conducting a direct sales comparison analysis, the County's
expert arrived at the value of the one-acre home site through two separate
methods—the accuracy of one being a check on the accuracy of the other. First.
Mr. Hales calculated the value of the legal right to build a primary residence, and
he concluded that this legal right represents 65% of the parcel's overall value. For
a SI.8 million parcel this would be $1,170,000. In order to confirm that this
7

allocation was accurate, he then calculated the value of larjid on which no
residential building permit could be obtained, and he cone uded that the value of
such acreage in the same area as the Petitioners' is $3,000 per acre. The allocated
value of the 150 acres of conservation-easement burdened land, therefore, would
be $450,000.2 This second appraisal approach thereby confirmed that the 65%
figure for the one-acre home site was very close to correct. Both appraisal
approaches are valid and persuasive, and both were accept* d bv the Commission.
The Commission understood Mr. Hales' testimony, at least in part, and
recited it in its Findings of Fact. The Commission stated,
27.

To estimate the allocation to the one acre. Mr. Hales relied on

two methods: 1) determining the value of the unbuildable portion of the
property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build bv considering
sales of conservation easements. [. . . ] In this analysis, Mr. Hales
indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and onlv the one-acre.

2

It is probable that eight of the nine acres in the ten-acre building envelope also
would be valued at only $3,000 per acre. State law allows agricultural buildings to
be built without a permit. Utah Code § 58-56-4(5)(a). Therefore, zoning laws do
not control their construction, and even property that is colloquialh referred to as
"unbuildable"* can have barns and corrals built on them. Consequentlv. this
$3,000 per acre figure for "unbuildable" land necessarily includes the inherent
right to build such buildings. As eight of the nine other acres in the building
envelope are limited to agricultural buildings, the evidence would indicate that
those eight acres are probabh worth approximately this amount per acre. The
onlv acre (other than the primary home site) that may be valued differentK would
be the one on which a caretaker dwelling could be built—a building that would
require a building permit. Mr. Hales was not asked to evaluate the value of the
acre on which a caretaker dwelling was built because no suchj dwellings have vet
been built.
8

used by the Count) as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of
conservation easements he relied on six sales and concluded that the right
to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would represent
approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be
allocated to the unbuildable agricultural and recreational land. In his
reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the total
value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to
the agricultural land.
Record at 63.
However, after reciting this accurate understanding of Mr. Hales'
testimony, the Commission then concluded that the entire ten-acre building
envelope is "developable" and "buildable/* and that Mr. Hales erred in allocating
the 65% \alue to the one-acre home site. Record at 64. In one sense, of course,
the Commission was right: barns, corrals, and a caretaker dwelling can be built on
the other nine acres within the ten-acre envelope. So in one meaning of the word,
those acres are also "buildable." However, the building right that was evaluated
by Mr. Hales was not the right to build a barn: it was the right to build a single
primary residence And that right was consumed once, and in its entirety, within
the one-acre home site. The right to build that home was the only "building right"
that Mr. Hales \alued. It was an error on the part of the Commission to dilute this
right by allocating it to the other nine acres where it could never be exercised.
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Mr Hales was the only witness who provided any (evidence that accurately
reflected the "realitv that the building site is worth more than the undevelopable
I
property " Record at 64. Nevertheless, the Commission faults Mr. Hales tor not
providing even more evidence: namely a direct sales comparison analysis. To the
extent that a direct sales comparison analysis would help a fact-finder understand
the allocation of value in this case, the Countv has demonstrated the desire to fill
this perceived gap by filing a petition for de novo review in district court/
However, even absent this additional evidence, the Commission's decision, as it
currentlv stands, is not supported by the only testimony that the Commission cites
to support it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Wasatch County asks the Court to reverse the
Commission's factual finding that 65% of the value of each parcel is attributable
to the ten-acre building envelope. In its place, the County a$ks the Court to follow
the evidence that the Commission found to be uncontroverted; namely, that 65%
of the value of each parcel should be allocated to the one-acrp home sites that have
been established in each parcel.
DATED this 3 / day of March. 200<

THOMAS L. LOVv. Attorney for Wasatch County
Appellee and Cross-appellint
* This petition was denied by the district court and the Countv js appeal from that
decision is now pending before this Court in case number 200p0732.
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ADDENDA:
EXHIBIT I:

Utah State Tax Commission Standard of Practice 7.4.1
(available at
http: www.property tax. Utah, gov standards standard07.pdQ
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Standard 7 - Farm Land Assessment Act
Standards of Practice
Primary Producers
Under certain circumstances primary producers may also process agricultural products
In these cases the land devoted to processing activities does not qualify for FAA
assessment In such cases there may be a fine line between production and
processing County assessors must gather all facts necessary to make an accurate
distinction While there are no hard-and-fast rules that clearly distinguish between
production and processing the following guideline may prove helpful
Guideline
In general, processing begins with those steps typically earned out at the first level of
trade beyond production Storage or packaging within the wholesale trade would
constitute processing as would slaughtering livestock The producer's interim storage
prior to sale to a wholesaler or other middleman would be considered a phase of
production Silage is a special case While the final product is different from the product
that was initially stored the process should still be considered a primary production
activity
Processing occurs with activities that enhance the value of primary agricultural products
such as when they are broken into smaller parts or combined with other products Milling
grain, pasteurizing milk and packaging vegetables constitute processing Packaging
products for transport to either the wholesale or retail market would not constitute
processing however packaging them for sale would be considered processing The test
is whether the packaging used for transporting is suitable packaging for retail sale
7.3.2 Multiple Use of Land
To be eligible for FAA, it makes no difference whether agricultural use is the primary or
secondary use of a land parcel As long as other uses do not hinder or exclude the
agricultural use, a parcel may receive FAA assessment (See Salt Lake County v
Kennecott Corporation, 1989, No 3870368 )

Standard 7.4

Acreage Requirement

7.4.0 Acreage Requirement
To meet the qualifications for assessment under the FAA land must be five contiguous
acres in size Exceptions are noted in Standard 7 43 ''Less Than Five Acres'
7.4.1 Home Site Deduction and Residential Exemption
Land on which the farmhouse is located and land used in connection with the
farmhouse i e landscaping gardening spots etc are not eligible for FAA assessment
and cannot be included in the acreage to determine FAA eligibility They shall be valued
and taxed using the same standards methods and procedures that apply to other
taxable land in the county [Section 59-2-507(2)]
Guideline
The county assessor should establish a common home site size on a countywide or
area-wide basis to be deducted from eligible land This home site size cannot be
included in the total acreage for FAA eligibility purposes The home site market value
listed on the assessment roll should equal the market value of an equivalent building
site A property assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act is to receive the
residential exemption only for the home site (R884-24P-52)
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